Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance in African Firms: A Comprehensive Review

Résumé

This article provides a comprehensive review of the existing literature on agency conflicts and corporate governance in African firms, with a focus on understanding the unique challenges and dynamics that shape these relationships within the continent's diverse economic and regulatory environments. Agency conflicts, which arise due to divergent interests between corporate managers (agents) and shareholders (principals), present significant governance challenges that can affect firm performance, market confidence, and economic development. In Africa, these conflicts are often compounded by unique factors such as concentrated ownership structures, limited enforcement of governance standards, and socio-cultural influences that differ from those in more developed markets.

The review systematically examines the manifestation of agency conflicts in African firms, analyzing key drivers such as board composition, ownership patterns, regulatory frameworks, and socio-economic contexts. It further explores how these factors influence governance practices and outcomes across different regions and sectors within Africa. The article also highlights the limitations in current research and identifies gaps in the literature that warrant further investigation. The findings of this review provide valuable insights for policymakers, practitioners, and scholars interested in enhancing corporate governance standards and promoting sustainable economic growth in Africa.