Informality of VSEs: ambivalence of institutional control

Authors

  • Simon Joseph Gérard PETER LARSIG, Institut Supérieur de Technologie (Libreville-GABON)
  • Pierre Daniel INDJENDJE NDALA LARSIG, Institut Supérieur de Technologie (Libreville-GABON)

Keywords:

VSEs, informal, , institutional constraints, rules

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to show the link between the ambivalence born from institutions and the embedding of VSEs in the informal sector. We define a relational model via institutional arrangements, through the attitudes and behaviors of public agents and VSE managers. Our theoretical anchoring is neo‑institutional theory. We adopt a hypothetico‑deductive logic and a quantitative methodology, allowing us to explain this reality from empirical observations. Data come from a questionnaire administered to 133 VSEs. We use binary logistic regression to model the maintenance of VSEs in the informal sector by institutional actors. Our results indicate that VSEs are kept informal under institutional pressure from public officials. The arrangements proposed by these institutional actors suit the managers, who adhere to them. Institutional pressures threaten VSE activities, which also contributes to keeping them informal.

 

Published

2026-04-27

How to Cite

PETER , S. J. G., & INDJENDJE NDALA , P. D. (2026). Informality of VSEs: ambivalence of institutional control. International Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, 5(2), 102–122. Retrieved from https://ijemsjournal.com/index.php/home/article/view/135

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Section

Articles